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MANAGING LEGITIMACY IN COMPLEX AND HETEROGENEOUS 
ENVIRONMENTS: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN A GLOBALIZED 
WORLD  
 
ABSTRACT 
The sustainability problems of the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and 
services increasingly challenges the legitimacy of corporations. Corporate legitimacy, 
however, is vital to the survival of corporations in competitive environments. The literature 
distinguishes three strategies that corporations commonly employ to address legitimacy 
problems: adapt to external expectations, try to manipulate the perception of their 
stakeholders or engage in a discourse with those who question their legitimacy. This paper 
develops a theoretical framework for the application of different legitimacy strategies and 
suggests that corporations facing sustainability problems have to be able to activate all three 
legitimacy strategies, despite their inherent incompatibilities. 
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INTRODUCTION: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
LEGITIMACY 
The World Commission on Economic Development (WCED) of the United Nations defines 
sustainable development (SD) as the ‘development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ and suggests that this 
‘should become a central guiding principle of the United Nations, Governments and private 
institutions, organizations and enterprises’ (United Nations, 1987). SD rests on three 
principles: environmental integrity, social equity, and economic prosperity (Bansal, 2005). In 
its recent analysis of the current state of the planet, the WWF has shown that the current 
system of human development is clearly unsustainable and by 2030 humanity would need the 
resources of more than two planets to satisfy the needs of globalized systems of production 
and consumption. Ecosystems are being degraded, the supply of food, water and energy is 
becoming problematic and humanity is more vulnerable to natural disasters, health risks and 
resource-driven conflicts. The globalization of economic processes intensifies problems such 
as global warming, chemical pollution, ocean acidification, water scarcity, and biodiversity 
loss (WWF, 2012, see also Rockstrom et al., 2009). Since these problems regularly manifest 
themselves as negative side-effects of global business activities (Buckley & Ghauri, 2004), 
‘the legitimacy of business has fallen to levels not seen in recent history’ (Porter & Kramer, 
2011, p. 64). 
While the business world was initially reluctant to assume responsibilities for SD beyond 
economic interests (Bansal, 2002; Hedstrom et al., 1998), the impact of unsustainable 
business practices on their legitimacy has motivated many corporations to engage with the SD 
discourse. Today, many corporations have adopted sustainability principles as part of their 
mission statement (WBCSD, 2011). Legitimacy can be understood as the social acceptance of 
actions or institutions and is ascribed to corporations in processes of social construction 
(Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Legitimacy is vital to corporations as 
 
  
          
it is a precondition for the continuous flow of resources and for securing the sustained support 
of the organization’s constituencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Legitimacy becomes relevant 
for corporations when their actions are perceived as inappropriate and undesirable within their 
respective societal contexts (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; Suchman, 1995). With the growing 
societal sensitivity for social and environmental harm occurring along globalized systems of 
production and consumption, the SD discourse is probably the key driving force of corporate 
legitimacy problems. Dealing with SD-related issues is challenging when operating in 
fragmented and dynamic global environments with a multitude of complex and often 
contradictory sustainability demands. We therefore address two research questions: First, 
what strategies do corporations possess for dealing with SD-related legitimacy challenges 
and when are they employed? Second, how can corporations deal with contradictory 
sustainability demands requiring conflicting legitimacy strategies? 
Suchman (1995) argues that organizational legitimacy can either rest on the benefits 
that are perceived to spring from the organization’s existence or behaviour (pragmatic 
legitimacy), or on the subconscious acceptance of the organization, its structures, and 
processes, as representative of a ‘normal’ status quo (cognitive legitimacy), or on an explicit 
moral discourse about the acceptability of the organization and its activities (moral 
legitimacy). In the management literature, the connection between the corporation, legitimacy, 
and SD has followed Suchman’s categorization but focused on the pragmatic and cognitive 
perspective. Pragmatic legitimacy has been explored from resource-based theory (Barney, 
1991), cognitive legitimacy from an institutional theory perspective (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
Resource-based theorists emphasize the business case for SD and argue that certain 
resources and capabilities help corporations realize higher economic rents by contributing to 
SD (Christmann, 2000; Hart, 1995). This instrumental view complements the position of 
authors who support the business case for corporate social responsibility (CSR) (McWilliams 
 
  
          
& Siegel, 2001), environmental sustainability (Orlitzky et al., 2011), or green management 
(Siegel, 2009). In situations where corporations see their legitimacy challenged and their 
access to resources from key constituencies potentially threatened, they may opt for either of 
two strategies. According to the instrumental view they may either provide economic benefits 
to their constituencies or engage in impression management and other manipulation strategies 
in order to maintain or repair their legitimacy. Institutional theorists, in turn, suggest that 
corporations strive for societal approval and respond to institutional pressures by adapting to 
SD principles (Jennings & Zandbergen, 1995; Schaefer, 2007). Schaefer (2007) and Bansal 
(2005) argue that institutional forces are the dominant drivers of the corporate engagement 
with environmental management systems.  
The management of legitimacy by either passive isomorphic adaptation or by active 
strategic manipulation of social expectations was regarded as one of the preconditions for the 
survival of organizations, especially under conditions of low complexity (Oliver, 1991). 
Today, the situation has changed (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006). Corporations often face 
conditions of increasing complexity in their social environment (Child & Rodrigues, 2011; 
Jones & Fleming, 2003; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Multinational 
corporations (MNCs) in particular operate across national borders with heterogeneous 
legislation and enforcement mechanisms and in diverse cultural environments that often have 
radically different social expectations and mores. In order to address legitimacy gaps these 
companies seek standards for behaviour which in many cases are yet to be established 
(Brunsson, Rasche, & Seidl, 2012). In a globalized world the regulatory power of the nation-
state governance system is in decline (Beck, 2000; Habermas, 2001; Kobrin, 2001) and 
cultural homogeneity within social communities is eroding due to processes of migration and 
individualization (Beck, 2000; Beck-Gernsheim & Beck, 2002). Under these conditions, 
which have been referred to as the postnational constellation (Habermas, 2001) or post-
Westphalian order (Cutler, 2001), the power to address issues of public concern, to define 
 
  
          
standards for behaviour, and to determine the conditions under which SD can unfold is 
shifting from state institutions to private actors (e.g. business firms) and civil society actors 
(e.g. NGOs and social movements) (Beck, 2000; Chandler & Mazlish, 2005; Kobrin, 2001; 
Mathews, 1997). As a result the social environment has become highly ambiguous and 
corporations have difficulties in maintaining their legitimacy (Kobrin, 2009; Kostova & 
Zaheer, 1999). The strategies of simply adapting to the environment or manipulating the 
perceptions of the most important social constituencies do not work as smoothly as they once 
did. In the course of the globalization process, the social environment has become 
heterogeneous and ambiguous, and often accepted standards of behaviour, such as legal rules 
or self-regulation schemes (Shelton, 2000), are fragmented or not available (Fischer-Lescano 
& Teubner, 2004), so that the corporation has to engage in a process of mutual adaptation 
where it is not clear from the outset whether the corporation or the societal expectations will 
dominate the resolution or whether a new position is created. Palazzo and Scherer (2006) 
have elaborated on the perspective of moral legitimacy proposed by Suchman, and have 
argued that in some situations corporations have to engage in moral reasoning in order to 
maintain their legitimacy.  
The key difference between the moral, cognitive and pragmatic strategies of 
legitimacy lies in their respective assumptions about the locus of control. While the pragmatic 
view puts forward that the corporation can influence how its key constituencies perceive its 
legitimacy, the cognitive view builds on the assumption that the corporation is subject to the 
control of surrounding institutional pressures and routines. The moral legitimacy view, in turn, 
argues that legitimacy results from the discourses that connect organizations with their 
environment. Whether these legitimacy strategies are mutually exclusive and whether they 
could and even should be combined has yet to be resolved (Lamin & Zaheer, 2011).  
 
  
          
Building on the SD discourse, our paper challenges two assumptions of the scholarly 
debate on legitimacy: First, despite their often significant conceptual differences, the 
scholarly debate treats legitimacy as a general perception about the corporation as such while 
we argue that legitimacy results from a broad variety of often parallel and contradictory 
perceptions of the corporation with regards to specific SD issues – ranging from 
environmental issues such as water scarcity to social issues such as working conditions in 
supplier factories. Second, theoretical assumptions behind the different approaches – from the 
resource-based view, institutional theory, or discourse ethics – are so contradictory that the 
discussion gives the impression that corporations have to choose one general legitimacy 
strategy from the three options of manipulation, adaptation and deliberation. In contrast, we 
will argue that corporations have all three options at their disposition and the appropriate 
choice depends on the particular issue at stake. Particularly in fragmented and dynamic global 
environments, facing a multitude of complex and often contradictory sustainability demands, 
there is no ‘one-best-way’, but corporations are left with the ‘paradox’ (Smith & Lewis, 2011) 
of enacting all three strategies simultaneously. The existing literature offers insights into the 
different approaches to managing response strategies, especially in complex environments 
with heterogeneous or paradoxical demands (Child & Rodriguez, 2010; Greenwood et al., 
2011; Pache & Santos, 2010; Simsek, 2009; Sirmon et al., 2007). However, the combination 
of legitimation strategies and their organizational prerequisites have not yet been explored. 
In the present paper we will argue that the successful maintenance of corporate 
legitimacy in the face of increasingly complex and heterogeneous SD-related demands is 
likely to depend on the organizational capability to activate each of the three legitimacy 
strategies, as this allows responding to specific legitimacy challenges with the most suitable 
strategy. Corporations need to switch efficiently between these strategies, and even to manage 
the pursuit of all three simultaneously, as required by the circumstances.  
 
  
          
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section we will address our first 
research question by discussing the different legitimacy strategies and developing a 
framework for the management of corporate legitimacy in complex environments. This will 
be further elaborated in the third section where we will present anecdotal evidence of how 
corporations employ the different legitimacy strategies. In the fourth section we will address 
our second research question and discuss potential approaches ( ‘one best way approach’, 
‘contingency approach’, and ‘paradox approach’) for selecting legitimacy strategies in 
complex environments with heterogeneous sustainability demands. We will elaborate on the 
paradox approach as the most promising and outline the preconditions for accommodating 
such an approach within the organization. We conclude with a reflection on the contributions 
of this study.  
MANAGING CORPORATE LEGITIMACY IN COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS: A 
FRAMEWORK 
Business firms are considered legitimate when their organizational practices are perceived to 
satisfy the social expectations of their environment. Normally, capitalist institutions such as 
business firms, property rights, contractual obligations etc. meet general expectations of how 
society should work, and do not raise legitimacy concerns unless everyday routines fail or 
unless there is a crisis. Within the capitalist system, economic institutions and processes are 
highly routinized and unfold within the established and socially accepted legal rules of the 
economic game. As long as these taken-for-granted institutions and processes do not fail and 
are not questioned, they build upon cognitive legitimacy. This legitimacy is disputed if social 
actors perceive a mismatch between the corporation’s status-quo or behaviour and societal 
expectations (see Figure 1).  
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The postnational constellation will make such a situation more likely, as in the global arena 
corporations often operate under conditions of governance gaps due to global public goods 
problems (Kaul et al., 2003), incapable or unwilling national governments (Beck, 2000; 
Kobrin, 2001), insufficient regulatory power of international organizations (Beck, 2000; 
Habermas, 2001), and a lack of acceptable and coherent standards of behaviour (Chandler & 
Mazlish, 2005).   
A failure of routine and a crisis of legitimacy can occur on three different institutional 
levels: a specific corporation, a specific industry, or the economy as a whole. The legitimacy 
of a particular company may be questioned as a result of a corporate scandal, while the 
increased incidence of corporate misbehaviour or the involvement in unsustainable business 
practices may also raise questions about the legitimacy of a particular industry (e.g. the 
chemical or the banking industry) or even of the capitalist system as a whole – the latter case 
is illustrated by the intensification of anti-globalization activism by civil society groups and 
the recent ‘Occupy Wall Street’ movement, which emerged during the financial crisis. 
We suggest that, logically, corporations have three different legitimacy strategies at 
their disposal to (re)establish the congruence between their organizational practices and social 
expectations, summarised in Figure 1 (Oliver, 1991; Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; Suchman, 
1995): the isomorphic adaptation strategy, the strategic manipulation strategy, or the strategy 
of moral reasoning. The isomorphic adaptation strategy means that corporations can change 
their organizational practices and adapt to social expectations in order to maintain cognitive 
legitimacy (Deephouse, 1996). This can take the form of (a) coercive isomorphism, when the 
corporation is driven by pressure to adapt to cultural or institutional expectations of its 
societal environment, (b) mimetic isomorphism when corporate managers resolve their 
uncertainty over decisions and outcomes by imitating best practices of exemplary firms or 
managers, or (c) normative isomorphism when managers have similar professional 
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backgrounds and adhere to the same professional standards. This means that organizational 
practices are determined to a high degree by societal expectations. In Figure 1 this is indicated 
by the arrow in the isomorphic adaptation box, which points from societal expectations to 
organizational practice. Such a scenario might arise when corporations change their practices 
to meet the interests and legitimacy concerns of their most powerful stakeholder groups 
(Mitchell et al., 1997). 
The strategic manipulation strategy describes cases where corporations actively 
influence social expectations by swaying or even manipulating the perceptions of key actors 
or policy-makers in their environment (Barley, 2010; Child & Rodriguez, 2011; Oliver, 1991). 
The notion of ‘manipulation’ refers to ‘the active attempt to alter the content of institutional 
requirements and to influence their promoters’ (Pache & Santos, 2010, p. 463). Here, societal 
expectations are mainly shaped by the corporation’s political strategy (Hillman, Keim, & 
Schuler, 2004), which in Figure 1 is indicated by the respective arrow in the strategic 
manipulation box. The corporation attempts to influence these expectations through 
advertising campaigns, the dissemination of (mis)information, lobbying, and other 
instruments of strategic public relations. The aim is to create a favourable public image so that 
its social constituencies perceive the corporation as beneficial, even if its practices do not 
necessarily correspond to that image (Barley, 2010; Fombrun, 2001; Oliver, 1991). 
The third strategy, that of moral reasoning, builds upon a process of deliberation. The 
organization engages in an open discourse with focal stakeholders or societal groups in order 
to argue for the acceptability of its status quo and behaviour (Habermas, 1990). Both parties 
consider the pros and cons of their own and the other party’s position and try to find a 
common solution that is based on a sound argument and serves the well-being of society 
rather than egoistic motives or narrow interests. This mode of interaction ‘reflects a pro-social 
logic that differs fundamentally from narrow self-interest’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 579). Unlike 
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persuasion strategies, which aim to establish one’s own position by manipulating the other 
party’s position, moral reasoning means that the two parties try to learn from each other and 
eventually adapt their positions constructively. The aim is to reach a consensus (or at least an 
informed compromise) and ultimately a new match between organizational practices and 
societal expectations that will (re)establish legitimacy (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006). Multi-
stakeholder initiatives that target regulatory gaps with regards to particular SD challenges 
such as deforestation, overfishing or water scarcity illustrate how corporations engage in 
arenas of deliberation with other corporations, civil society organization and governments, in 
order to define and enforce global behavioural standards. 
Corporations opt for either the isomorphic adaptation strategy or the manipulation 
strategy primarily in order to maintain their legitimacy. Occasionally, these strategies are 
complemented or even substituted by moral reasoning. In line with the economic and 
institutional approaches, we expect that the particular choice of legitimacy strategy can be 
explained on the basis of two factors: first, the costs of organizational change, i.e. the costs 
incurred by making necessary changes to a corporation’s structure and processes so that they 
match societal expectations and contribute to sustainable development (McWilliams & Siegel, 
2001; Hart, 1995); second, the consistency of societal expectations to which the corporation 
has to respond when attempting to (re)establish its legitimacy. The latter factor draws on 
institutional theory (Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010; Powell & DiMaggio, 
1991) and the theory of paradox (Smith & Lewis, 2011).  
A failure of organizational routine that reduces the societal acceptability of a 
corporation and its behaviour will incur costs in the form of time, labour, and assets that are 
necessary in order to resolve the misfit between organizational practice and societal 
expectations. In order to respond effectively to sustainability issues that are put forward by 
societal stakeholder groups, corporations have to rearrange their value chains (e.g. stop 
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sourcing from countries with undemocratic regimes), change their production processes or 
product technologies (e.g. implement green technologies), or spend resources (e.g. invest in 
infrastructure and public goods such as public transportation, education, or security in host 
countries where public authorities are not able or willing to do so) in order to preserve the 
natural environment or protect human rights. 
Scholars who adopt the economic theory of the firm perspective on CSR argue that 
there are benefits and costs of corporate social responsibility and sustainability that managers 
take into account when responding to legitimacy issues (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; 
Orlitzky et al., 2011; Springle & Maines, 2010). They suggest that rational managers invest in 
corporate sustainability as long as the benefits exceed or at least equal the costs (McWilliams 
& Siegel, 2001; Siegel, 2009). Proponents of the resource-based theory, on the other hand, 
suggest that corporations may achieve a favourable position in competition when they 
develop specific competences that are valuable and contribute to sustainability but are not 
substitutable by other competences and difficult to imitate (Barney, 1991; Christmann, 2000; 
Hart, 1995). For other corporations such competences represent an entry barrier and their 
acquisition, although necessary when implementing a sustainability strategy, incurs costs.  
MNCs have extended their activities to countries and cultures that have different 
societal and institutional conditions. As global actors, they are exposed to two contradictory 
pressures: on the one hand, globalization promotes a transnational standardization of rules and 
(mainly soft law) regulation: ‘the globalization of practices and cultures increasingly exposes 
organizations to the simultaneous influence of local and global institutional pressures. Local 
regulative, cognitive, and cultural influences interfere with national and global trends toward 
homogenization of rules, values, and practices’ (Pache & Santos, 2010, p. 471). On the other 
hand, the diversity of local contexts in which MNCs operate creates institutional 
contradictions. As a result, corporations are confronted with a multitude of expectations from 
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primary stakeholders, such as company owners, employees, customers, or suppliers, and from 
secondary stakeholders, such as NGOs or activists, local communities, or governments 
(Waddock et al., 2002), as well as with pressures from a variety of international institutions 
(Waddock, 2008). This simultaneous tendency towards more homogeneity and more 
heterogeneity  becoming manifest in various local and global expectations creates tensions. 
Under these conditions, companies seek accepted standards of behaviour (e.g., with respect to 
social and environmental issues), which provide a level playing field, incur the same costs on 
all companies within an industry, and at the same time provide them with legitimacy. 
However, even though self-regulation and standardisation of business practices is a prevalent 
phenomenon in global business regulation (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000) such standards are 
not always available around the globe in every industry, every region, or on every 
sustainability issue as these standards are sometimes contested (e.g. the responsibility of 
private companies for the protection of human rights) (see e.g. Ruggie, 2007) and the 
institutionalization process of codes of conduct for global business and value chains is a 
recent phenomenon and many companies, industries and regions still lag behind. Some 
students of international law even claim that this situation of heterogeneity and fragmentation 
of rules will continue as it reflects ‘deep contradictions between colliding sectors of a global 
society’ (Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, 2004, p. 1004). 
As a result, MNCs operate under conditions of complexity and may often face highly 
heterogeneous expectations from their societal and institutional environment (Child & 
Rodriguez, 2011; Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Heterogeneous 
environments that pose different and contradicting social demands on corporations 
correspondingly have varied societal expectations, while in homogeneous environments social 
expectations tend to be consistent.  
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We suggest that where social expectations are consistent and/or widely accepted 
standards of behaviour exist, corporations tend to choose adaptation strategies when the costs 
of organizational change are low and active manipulation strategies when these costs are high. 
In the latter case, corporations engage in decoupling (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008); for 
example, they attempt to leave the organizational machinery as it is and create a positive 
public image by simply evoking the impression that the corporation complies with established 
standards, with the help of public relations and strategic manipulation strategies. This way 
they simply appear legitimate in the eyes of the societal environment (Ashforth & Gibbs, 
1990) and of key stakeholders or policy makers (Barley, 2010) even though their business 
processes have not changed. This tendency is more pronounced when corporations have the 
power to actively influence their environment (Child & Rodriguez, 2011) and when the 
societal expectations are not represented within the company – e.g. when there are no 
organizational members that feel responsible for social or environmental issues (Pache & 
Santos, 2010).  
Corporations that employ manipulation strategies do not modify the practices that 
some of their stakeholders criticize; instead, they manipulate the perception of those 
stakeholders in order to avoid the pressure. While such strategies of decoupling and 
impression management are discussed critically in the business and society literature (Palazzo 
& Richter, 2005; Weaver et al., 1999), it is important to highlight here that they are neither 
good nor bad in normative terms. As we will argue later on, external demands can be based 
on unrealistic claims, poor data, or misunderstandings (Teegen, Doh, & Vachari, 2004) and 
may often collide with the expectations of other stakeholders (Calton & Payne, 2004; Pache 
& Santos, 2010). A corporation can apply strategic manipulation or isomorphic adaptation to 
a wide range of situations in order to maintain its legitimacy. However, both strategies have 
limitations and may fail under certain conditions. There is always the danger that a 
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corporation’s attempts to manipulate perceptions may be uncovered by those who are targeted 
by the strategy, which may have the opposite effect and damage the corporation’s legitimacy 
(Patriotta, Gond, & Schultz, 2011).  
Even though there is some evidence that strategic manipulation is often successful 
(Barley, 2010), the cases of Enron (fraudulent book-keeping, Ley Toffler & Reingold, 2003; 
Time Magazine, 2002), Siemens (widespread corruption; New York Times, 2008), or BP 
(disregard for safety standards and highly risky tactics; New York Times, 2011) are a 
reminder that once the image of legitimacy is exposed as a façade, the consequences for 
companies and top managers in terms of cost and reputation can be disastrous. In all three 
cases the corporations had created positive public images with the help of public relations: 
Enron had even been considered a ‘CSR poster child’ thanks to its publicly announced CSR 
policies (Murphy, 2008). Likewise, Siemens was a forerunner in many CSR initiatives and 
communicated its policies very actively (Kaufmann, 2008), while BP had created a pro-
sustainability image with the slogan ‘Beyond Petrol’ (Muralidharan et al., 2011). However, as 
the scandals associated with these corporations have shown, none had actually implemented 
its publicly announced policies by sufficiently changing its corporate structures and practices. 
These scandals were the result of misconduct by individuals, as well as of systematic 
problems with incentives and control within the companies. Strategic manipulation and 
keeping up a façade are more likely to fail when there is anti-corporate action by NGOs and 
stakeholder activists (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Teegen, Doh, & Vachari, 2004) and 
when transparency is high and information can be readily disseminated to the relevant public 
via the media (e.g. the internet or news agencies) (Patriotta, Gond, & Schultz, 2011).  
A strategy of adaptation may also fail if the organization faces many heterogeneous 
and contradictory expectations (Lamin & Zaheer, 2011). In such cases, adapting to the 
expectations of one part of the social environment is likely to clash with the expectations of 
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other societal sectors: ‘in conflict situations plain compliance is problematic, since complying 
with one demand requires defying the competing other(s)’ (Pache and Santos, 2010, p. 463). 
Palazzo and Scherer (2006) have argued that during the process of globalization the societal 
environment of multinational firms has become fragmented and heterogeneous, and industry 
standards and self-regulation schemes are often not yet available, but first need to be 
developed. Under these conditions, adaptation strategies are insufficient for maintaining 
corporate legitimacy. By contrast, in cases of low consistency of societal expectations, 
strategic manipulation as well as moral reasoning strategies can be applied selectively to 
certain stakeholder groups in order to address their legitimacy concerns either by means of 
manipulation or argumentation. Manipulation strategies, however, may prove insufficient: the 
corporation may not be able to actually influence the relevant societal groups in the first place, 
while the widespread availability of information and communication means that corporate 
manipulation strategies may be easily discovered and circumvented. Under such conditions 
moral reasoning will become more important for managing corporate legitimacy (Palazzo & 
Scherer, 2006). 
However, we suggest that moral reasoning cannot completely substitute adaptation 
and strategic action. The complexity of the corporation’s steering task in competitive market 
societies would overburden the corporation in its strategic course if only moral reasoning was 
available as a means of establishing legitimacy. Therefore, moral reasoning has to be regarded 
either as a retreat strategy when the mechanisms of social routine, adaptation, and 
manipulation fail, or as a proactive strategy for establishing relationships of trust with the 
corporation’s constituencies or for addressing emerging sustainability issues that may erode 
the corporation’s legitimacy in the future. The strategy of moral reasoning may be appropriate 
when societal expectations are heterogeneous and corporations engage in moral discourse 
with particular societal groups in order to selectively address and eventually satisfy their 
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demands (Calton & Payne, 2004). Unlike the adaptation strategy, moral reasoning can be 
applied selectively to particular stakeholder groups and this will not necessarily lead to a 
mismatch with the expectations of other societal groups. However, moral reasoning is costly 
and requires particular efforts from those who engage in it. Therefore, it cannot entirely 
substitute social routines, isomorphic adaptation, and strategic manipulation, which often help 
corporations tackle the legitimacy challenges of competitive environments more efficiently. 
In a globalized world, the environmental challenges and societal demands to which 
companies have to respond are in ‘continual flux’ (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 319). 
Greenwood and colleagues (2011, p. 351) note that the ‘sustainability of organizational 
responses and their alteration and variability across time is a neglected but important theme 
that deserves serious attention’. In this paper we address this issue and argue that corporations 
that possess the capability to simultaneously apply or to switch between the different 
legitimacy strategies (i.e., manipulation, adaptation and moral reasoning) are better able to 
preserve their legitimacy in face of highly fragmented and dynamic environments.  
Recently, Pache and Santos (2010, p. 473) proposed that there are ‘specific 
organizational skills’ that are necessary for ‘mobilizing particular strategies’ and suggested 
that the organizations that are ‘particularly competent in mobilizing these strategies are likely 
to be in a better position to survive and thrive in the mist of conflicting institutional demands’. 
However, the authors did not explore this issue further. According to the contingency theory 
they developed, an appropriate legitimacy strategy needs to be tailored to the specific 
requirements and legitimacy demands in a particular situation (see also Oliver, 1991). 
However, their theory neglects the dynamics of environmental challenges and at the same 
time regards conflict and heterogeneity among institutional demands as an exception rather 
than the rule in the globalized world (see the limitations in Pache and Santos, 2010, p. 472).  
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As we will argue in section four below, such a contingency approach has its 
limitations in a social environment characterized by increasing complexity, as companies may 
be confronted with paradoxical situations of high and low heterogeneity and high and low 
costs of organizational change at the same time. Instead, in order to survive corporations are 
likely to need the capability to flexibly activate all three legitimacy strategies, either 
subsequently or simultaneously, and to manage the paradoxical tensions between them despite 
their conflicting structural prerequisites. The theory of paradox will be helpful in this respect. 
Paradoxes have been discussed as “contradictory yet interrelated elements [of managerial 
challenges, the authors] that exist simultaneously and persist over time” (Smith and Lewis, 
2011, p. 382). Before we turn to the management of paradox the advantages and limitations of 
the three legitimacy strategies with regards to SD decisions in corporations are empirically 
illustrated.  
EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATION OF LEGITIMACY STRATEGIES WITH REGARDS 
TO SD ISSUES 
How can corporations react when their legitimacy is challenged because of sustainability 
problems? In a highly complex environment, under time pressure, with no acceptable 
standards of behaviour available, with little or no experience of how to handle the issue at 
stake and confronted with contradictory expectations and aggressive campaigning, it is far 
from clear which legitimacy strategy is best (Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010). 
As mentioned earlier, a moral reasoning strategy might be expected to be appropriate for 
responding to the failure of a normative routine. Nevertheless, opting for isomorphic 
adaptation or strategic manipulation might be a better choice. In fact, as the following 
examples aim to illustrate, it would be naïve to assume that, under the postnational 
constellation, cognitive and pragmatic strategies are always and necessarily inferior to a moral 
strategy, when legitimacy has to be repaired or maintained. 
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The case of Chiquita Brands International illustrates how strategic manipulation 
strategies might be successfully employed. Chiquita has been exposed to harsh criticism in 
the German, Swiss and Swedish mass media for its cooperation with the Rainforest Alliance. 
It was argued that the social and environmental standards of this civil society coalition were 
not sufficiently high. For instance, critics argued that as long as pesticides were used on the 
plantations, announcements about the reduction of pesticide use were mere window-dressing 
(DER SPIEGEL, 2006, 2008; Macquet & Kjellberg, 2011). How should the corporation react? 
On the one hand, Chiquita used to be considered a CSR leader and their partner, the 
Rainforest Alliance, is an expert NGO that has been working with Chiquita over several years 
and has also been a key player in various standard-setting, labelling, and monitoring 
initiatives. On the other hand, the credibility of this engagement and the reputation of the 
corporation were repeatedly challenged. Here, a natural response would be to inform the 
public (in a joint action with the Rainforest Alliance and other partners) about the criteria 
applied to rate Chiquita’s contribution to sustainable development and the challenges the 
corporation faces. In other words, it might make sense to react by adopting a strategic public 
relations approach if, first, the corporation already employs a credible moral reasoning 
strategy, second, if the accusations can be refuted, or, third, if the costs of implementing 
changes are too high (such costs could result e.g. from fulfilling the demand that the company 
immediately reduce the use of pesticides to zero).  
Criticism of a corporation’s practices might find broad public support even if it builds 
on false claims or unrealistic expectations (e.g. the idea that a large corporation could switch 
to a fair trade scheme or phase out a certain pesticide in a couple of weeks). In such a case, 
corporations might choose to defend their current sustainability engagement against criticism 
instead of complying with their opponents’ demands (Christmann & Taylor, 2002; Oliver, 
1991). Critique may not be advanced in a way that it constitutes a concrete alternative option 
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for the corporation: the Chiquita banana has for instance been accused of being less fair than 
the fair trade banana and less green than the bio banana. Yes, applying fair trade and bio 
criteria on large plantations might be very difficult, if not impossible from a technical 
perspective. However, moral reasoning might be chosen as a retreat strategy if the attempt to 
re-establish corporate credibility by informing the public fails and relevant and powerful 
actors join the critics. In such a case it might be highly risky to carry on using strategic public 
relations as a means of tackling the situation (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006). 
The appropriateness of an isomorphic adaptation strategy is evident in the examples 
we will discuss below. As mentioned earlier, some companies choose a proactive moral 
reasoning strategy, which involves setting and controlling new standards. In practice, this 
might entail implementing controlling procedures for which third parties, such as civil society 
organizations, are responsible, disclosing the names of the company’s supply-chain partners 
or joining multi-stakeholder initiatives for sustainable development (Bäckstrand, 2006; Basu 
& Palazzo, 2008). As soon as a major actor or at least a few actors in an industry take such 
steps, it makes sense for competitors or other industries to adapt to the emerging institutional 
context (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). For instance, while Nike’s decision to publish the names 
of its supply-chain partners was a proactive move that might be interpreted as the result of the 
company’s interaction with civil-society critics, the decision of Puma and Adidas to do the 
same a few days later can be interpreted as an isomorphic adaptation to a new standard 
(Doorey, 2011). If a new behavioural standard is established that does (or presumably will) 
meet with broad public acceptance, it might make sense for companies to adapt it to their 
specific circumstances, instead of going through the long process of devising similar 
standards with similar partners, which the strategy of moral reasoning would require. 
Nespresso’s (Alvarez et al., 2010) and McDonald’s (McDonald’s, 2007) decisions to work 
with the Rainforest Alliance can be interpreted as the result of an isomorphic adaptation 
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strategy. If the introduction of standards is costly this may prevent corporations from adapting 
to societal demands (Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010). However, if the pressure from 
societal groups is high, corporations may decide to adapt to societal demands despite costs: if 
these standards become established across an entire industry, the costs of organizational 
change will be redefined as costs of doing business. If all competitors in the industry have to 
bear the same type of costs, these will eventually be neutralized. Again, in such a scenario 
moral reasoning might be chosen as a retreat strategy if the legitimacy of the standard is 
disputed or alternative and more credible options emerge. However, when environmental 
expectations are consistent but global hard-law regulations are unclear or fragmented, 
isomorphic adaptation to an emerging soft-law standard can be an acceptable strategy in 
reaction to legitimacy challenges (Mörth, 2004; Shelton, 2000). 
While the discussion above outlines certain conditions under which manipulation or 
adaptation strategies might make sense as a first reaction to routine failures, choosing either 
strategy in reaction to changing expectations and challenged practices clearly has its limits. 
The following two examples illustrate the risks of reacting to normative challenges with a 
manipulation or adaptation strategy. 
The failure of isomorphic adaptation is exemplified by the case of Yahoo (Brenkert, 
2009) which can be considered as an instance of the fragmentation of law in the corporate 
environment even though this phenomenon has been widely dismissed in favour of a 
harmonization view on international law (Benvenisti & Downs, 2007). As Fischer-Lescano 
and Teubner (2004, p. 1004) point out, ‘the fragmentation of global law is not simply about 
legal norm collisions or policy-conflicts, but rather has its origin in contradictions between 
society-wide institutionalized rationalities, which law cannot solve’. Yahoo has expanded its 
operations to China: In 2002, Yahoo has signed the ‘Public pledge on self-discipline for the 
Chinese internet industry’, which is sponsored by the government-affiliated Internet Society 
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for China. Together with other internet providers, the company was accused of being the 
gatekeeper for an oppressive government by Human Rights Watch and other NGOs. In 
addition, two Chinese journalists were sentenced to ten years in jail because Yahoo disclosed 
their email addresses to the Chinese government (Brenkert, 2009; Dann & Haddow, 2008). 
This prompted much criticism, in reaction to which Yahoo published the statement that the 
company ‘must ensure that its local country sites must operate within the local laws, 
regulations, and customs’ (BBC, 2005). Torn between the expectations of (mainly Western) 
public expectations and those of the Chinese government, the company chose to adapt to the 
local rules, thereby not only provoking worldwide indignation, but also triggering a hearing in 
the US Congress on the complicity of internet companies with the human rights violations in 
China. Having ignored the moral dimension of its decision to cooperate with local authorities 
and chosen to adopt routinized behaviour that is approved in other geopolitical contexts, the 
company found itself trapped in a legitimacy crisis. Generally speaking, an isomorphic 
adaptation strategy may be considered inappropriate in cases of colliding standards that 
represent conflicting political, cultural or economic forces (Pache & Santos, 2010).  
In contrast to this, when societal expectations are fairly homogeneous, isomorphic 
adaptation strategies might also fail. Even in a situation when MNCs operate in a legal 
environment that is highly fragmented with regard to the legal regulation of sustainability 
issues, they might be confronted with much more homogeneous social expectations: for 
instance, they would be expected to source commodities such as palm oil, wood, cotton or 
coffee in a sustainable way without destroying the rain forest, wasting scarce water resources, 
or using child labour, issues that are often not regulated or only weakly enforced in the host 
countries in which the MNC is operating. Corporations that decide to fulfil the criteria of a 
multi-stakeholder initiative might adopt a soft-law standard (Mörth, 2004; Shelton, 2000) 
with regard to sustainability problems, because they are under isomorphic pressure to follow 
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the emerging practices of their industry. However, as Meyer and Rowan (1977) have already 
pointed out, commitment to a standard does not necessarily lead to a change in behaviour. 
The adoption of standards might be purely symbolic, decoupled from business operations 
(Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008). A corporation that joins the UN Global Compact, for instance, 
will not necessarily invest in sustainability as expected by this initiative. Given the multitude 
of competing soft-law standards – just for sustainable forest management there are more than 
50 such standards (Domask, 2003; Schepers, 2009) – corporations might be tempted to pick 
the easiest one and not the standard that forces them to organize their supply chain in a more 
sustainable way. In such a case, the adaptation strategy might be perceived as greenwashing 
(Laufer, 2003), and the process of delegitimation might not be stopped through isomorphic 
adaptation. 
Likewise, the failure of strategic manipulation is evident in the case of Wal-Mart: for 
several years now, Wal-Mart has been under pressure to address the social and environmental 
side effects of its business practices (Beaver, 2005). The campaign against the company 
culminated in Robert Greenwald’s 2005 documentary entitled ‘Wal-Mart: The High Cost of 
Low Price’. In reaction to the massive criticism, the corporation launched a large-scale 
advertising campaign aimed at presenting the arguments of its opponents as false and insisted 
that the public ought to have access to the correct ‘facts’ (Ethical Corporation, 2005). 
However, this PR campaign did not solve Wal-Mart’s problems but rather contributed to its 
legitimacy crisis. In response, the company then switched to a retreat strategy, initiating a 
discourse on environmental questions with experts critical of its practices and announcing it 
would make a $500 million investment in corporate sustainability. Recently, Wal-Mart has 
been attacked as greenwashers again, because they have not seriously advanced on 
implementing their greening strategy and they have not sufficiently engaged with civil society 
(Mitchell, 2012). In general, the success of a strategic manipulation strategy depends on the 
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ability of the corporation to persuade critics that their description of a certain situation, 
practice, or effect is wrong, while the corporation’s own description of the same is right. 
Repairing or maintaining legitimacy through strategic manipulation is a high-risk strategy if 
there is overwhelming evidence in support of the opponents’ position or if the opponents’ 
credibility is much higher than that of the corporation. In the case of Wal-Mart, it can be 
assumed that the corporation chose a strategic manipulation strategy to start with, instead of 
adapting to societal expectations, in order to avoid the costs of organizational change. 
However, refusing to adapt to generally consistent societal expectations can be dangerous for 
corporations and, as the Wal-Mart case indicates, such decisions can prove counterproductive 
if the costs of resisting change are higher than the costs of introducing change. 
The above examples provide some empirical evidence that supports the framework 
developed in Section 2. As explained further up, there are mainly two factors that influence 
the choice of legitimacy strategy: the consistency of environmental expectations and the costs 
of organizational change. When routines fail, organizations are often expected to change. 
However, the costs of change can be so high that corporations are more likely to decide to 
resist external expectations and to attempt to influence key stakeholders through strategic 
manipulation instead (Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010). In contrast, when the costs of 
change are low, corporations might choose to adapt quickly to expectations if the new 
standards of behaviour are visible and univocal. In the case of Nike, for instance, the decision 
to publish its list of suppliers was highly risky because competitors found out about Nike’s 
partners and this might have affected the corporation’s competitiveness. The decision of 
Puma and Adidas to follow Nike’s example, however, was not as risky. Besides the costs of 
change, the pressure of external expectations also influences the choice of legitimacy 
strategies. If those expectations are clear and unambiguous, they promote adaptation. If they 
are heterogeneous, fragmented, and contradictory, corporations might have a greater incentive 
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to engage in moral reasoning, even if the costs of change seem to be high. High costs of 
change and low consistency of expectations might favour the choice of strategic manipulation 
or of moral reasoning, if corporations are confronted with legitimacy issues.  
In the context of the postnational constellation, corporations have to find answers to 
the rising tide of legitimacy challenges. This does not mean that they should switch 
automatically from pragmatic and cognitive to moral legitimacy. Instead, corporations have to 
develop the sensitivity for identifying the appropriate strategy and the right mix of the three 
options open to them. There may even be a situation where a company is facing a multitude of 
sustainability issues and contradicting societal expectations at the same time, so that the 
response to legitimacy problems involves the balancing of high and low consistency and high 
and low costs of organizational change simultaneously. The response strategy of the 
corporation may require it to manipulate the societal environment, to adapt to social 
expectations and to engage in stakeholder dialogues at the same time, so that the challenge is 
to balance the inherent contradictions between these strategies and their organizational 
prerequisites without losing trust and credibility. 
From this paper’s point of view, corporations need to develop an ability to choose 
flexibly between the three types of strategies and to evaluate the appropriateness of each 
strategy in a situation of routine failure. For instance, if there are violations of workers’ rights 
in a corporation’s supply chain, the corporation might choose to engage in a moral discourse 
with NGOs (a case of moral legitimacy), and at the same time and with regards to another 
issue launch a PR campaign to announce to its various stakeholders that it has chosen to 
adhere to a particular standard and explain why it has chosen that particular standard, such as 
the Rainforest Alliance, over another standard, such as Fair Trade (an instance of pragmatic 
legitimacy). The same corporation might start to measure and release data on its water 
footprint on the basis of an established and accepted scientific method (an instance of 
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cognitive legitimacy). The choice of different strategies for different legitimacy challenges 
will not lead to additional legitimacy problems, as long as the objectives behind those choices 
are not perceived as contradictory (on conflicts of goals vs. conflicts of measures, see Pache 
& Santos, 2010). However, if a corporation engages in discussions on labour rights with 
unions and NGOs and at the same time lobbies the government to relax labour laws, it will be 
seen to have contradictory objectives so, in such case a combination of moral and pragmatic 
legitimacy strategies may not be appropriate and may provoke distrust and perception of 
illegitimacy. 
The appropriateness of strategic choices with regard to legitimacy might also change 
over time so that the corporation will change its legitimacy strategies accordingly. In t1, a 
corporation might decide to develop a solution for a sustainability problem through discussion, 
while in t2, if such a standard is already established and widely accepted, the organization 
might decide to adapt the standard without further dialogue (see Figure 1). And a second 
example, in t1 a corporation might develop an innovative solution for a sustainability 
challenge (e.g. pioneering the analysis of the life cycle of a specific product) and launch a 
marketing strategy that centres on this innovation, while in t2 it might join a multi-stakeholder 
initiative and engage in an industry-wide discourse in order to establish the very same 
innovation as an industry standard. As Child and Rodrigues have argued (2011: 809), the 
ability of organizations ‘to learn as they confront emergent and complex situations is a 
necessary condition for them to decide on how they will act in such situations’. 
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THE PARADOX OF ACCOMMODATING CONFLICTING LEGITIMACY 
STRATEGIES 
The empirical examples presented above demonstrate that all three legitimacy strategies with 
regards to the corporate contribution to SD have their particular advantages and weaknesses. 
As those cases illustrate, some strategies seem to work better in some situations than in others. 
In view of that, the crucial question for organizations is how to select the most appropriate 
legitimacy strategy. In principle, there are three possible approaches to responding to 
legitimacy demands in complex environments: (1) the ‘one best way’ approach, (2) the 
contingency approach, and (3) the paradox approach. 
The ‘one best way’ approach assumes that even though organizations face different 
situations, there is ultimately one best way of responding to legitimacy threats. Such a 
position can variously be found in the literature: Ulrich (2008), for instance, maintains that all 
legitimacy concerns should be dealt with discursively so that consensual solutions can be 
generated. In particular, corporations should refrain from strategic political action and from 
manipulating the corporate environment (Ulrich, 2000); that is to say, the moral reasoning 
strategy is the preferred option when assessing the corporate contribution to SD irrespective 
of the concrete situation. The same view is also reflected in the critical approach to strategic 
management (Alvesson & Willmott, 1995; Shrivastava, 1986). With respect to the strategy of 
a corporation Shrivastava (1986, p. 373) suggests ‘that stakeholders who influence or are 
influenced by organizations be identified as legitimate participants in the discourse on its 
strategy. Ideally, organizational goals should be settled discursively, through rational 
argumentation under undistorted communicative conditions.’ 
A very different example of this ‘one best way’ approach is the study by Siegel (2009), 
who regards instrumental action and strategic manipulation as the preferred legitimacy 
strategy. He argues that corporations should always stress the economic role of the business 
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firm when engaging with green strategies. According to his view, corporations are not directly 
responsible for advancing the social good, but for being productive and generating profits; it 
is ultimately up to governmental institutions to develop an appropriate regulatory framework 
that safeguards the social good (Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). Corporations maintain their 
legitimacy by providing economic value to their owners (shareholders) and – indirectly – by 
contributing to society and sustainable development via the allocation function of competitive 
markets. From this viewpoint, corporations either have to offer benefits to their constituencies 
or they should at least influence the perceptions of their main stakeholders and create a 
positive image by strategic manipulation and public relations in order to achieve pragmatic 
legitimacy (Suchman, 1995).  
Although attractive due to its simplicity, we would argue that the ‘one best way’ 
approach is highly problematic as it has severe shortcomings. First, its premises rest on 
idealistic assumptions about contextual conditions such as the readiness of organizational 
members and stakeholders to engage in a constructive discourse, the capacity of governmental 
institutions to set appropriate regulatory frameworks, or the allocation function of markets. 
Second, the approach tends to overlook the possibility that the envisioned solutions cannot 
always be realized: the various parties may not always reach consensus nor is it always 
possible to make the business case for the issue at hand (van den Hove, 2006). Third, the 
focus on a single legitimacy strategy seems like an unnecessary restriction, given that each of 
the three strategies has its own strengths and that companies are generally capable of 
employing more than one strategy. The assumption that corporations can always manipulate 
public discourse successfully in their favour when their legitimacy is in question is as naïve as 
assuming that consensus may be reached in any situation of conflict. Overall, the ‘one best 
way’ approach does not seem to tap the full potential of legitimacy strategies that corporations 
have at their disposal. For instance, while it might make sense to engage in a discourse with 
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e.g. critics when there are no adequate behavioural standards with regard to a specific 
sustainability problem, this approach would be less useful when such standards already exist 
and have been implemented by competitors. In such a situation, adapting to the standard 
without engaging in any discourse might be sufficient. 
A more promising approach than the ‘one best way’ approach is the contingency 
approach. This approach can also be found in the literature on the management of corporate 
responses to legitimacy issues (Christmann and Taylor, 2002; Oliver, 1991) or to complex 
and heterogeneous environments (Child and Rodrigues, 2011; Pache and Santos, 2010; 
Sirmon et al., 2007). The focus, here, is on the different strengths and weaknesses of each 
strategy in relation to different circumstances. In contrast to the ‘one best way’ approach the 
assumption that there is one strategy that fits all situations is refuted. Instead it is argued that, 
while there is one ‘best way’ for each situation, this way will vary, depending on the 
particular circumstances. Corporations need to identify the one way that fits best a specific 
situation in order to achieve ‘congruence’ between the environmental challenge they face and 
their strategic response (Hambrick, 1983; Simsek, 2009). 
Adapting to the environment in order to create ‘an acceptable fit’ (Hambrick, 1983; 
Sirmon et al., 2007, p. 275) and aligning organizational structures and processes to create 
internal ‘harmony’ (Sirmon et al., 2007, p. 287) are central pillars in contingency theory. 
Child and Rodrigues (2011), for example, argue that the choice of strategy in response to 
environmental demands depends on a corporation’s relative power. They suggest that less 
powerful corporations are limited to a single strategy while more powerful companies have 
greater choice, but finally focus on only one out of the set of available strategies to deal with 
environmental complexity. Pache and Santos (2010) suggest that the organizational response 
depends on two factors: the nature of environmental demands (conflict of goals vs. conflict of 
means) and the representation of these demands within the organization (whether there is a 
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single representation, multiple representations, or no representation). These authors assume 
that the environmental contingency factors determine the selection of the response strategy, 
and that this strategy resolves conflicts and balances heterogeneous demands.  
Even though the contingency approach is more sophisticated than the ‘one best way’ 
approach, its limitations are apparent in cases characterized by extreme degrees of 
environmental dynamism, complexity, and heterogeneity of societal demands. Under such 
conditions it is not possible to assume that there is ‘one best way’ for any given situation. On 
the contrary, it is more likely that corporations will need continuously to balance equifinal 
alternatives that lead only to suboptimal solutions (Gresov & Drazin, 1997). The inherent 
dynamic of the environment keeps societal demands in ‘continual flux’ (Greenwood et al., 
2011, p. 319), demanding ‘flexibility and agile actions’ (Simsek, 2009, p. 614) from the 
corporation. This means that a legitimacy strategy may become immediately obsolete and 
requires corporations to respond with ‘organizational fluidity’ (Schreyögg & Sydow, 2010).  
Likewise, if the inherent contradictions in environmental challenges and corporate 
responses prevail (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004), contradiction and conflict may be the rule, 
rather than the exception, in the process of managing legitimacy. Acknowledging this, Simsek 
(2009, p. 618) points to the limitations of his own contingency approach as ‘new opportunities 
(and threats) are constantly created by the organization’s internal and external dynamics’, 
which means that the organization ‘may never achieve a lasting balance’. Moreover, ‘there is 
not just one but many institutional environments’ (Scott, 1991, p. 167) with incompatible 
demands and the corporation has to respond to these by activating different legitimacy 
strategies at the same time. However, as Greenwood et al. have observed (2011, p. 351), 
‘most empirical studies assume or imply that organizations enact single and sustainable 
responses. In doing so, they largely ignore the fact that ‘different subunits […] find heterodox 
 
  
33/50 
ways of responding to the accountability demands of [their] environment’ (Binder, 2007: 567)’ 
(an early exception to this tendency is the study by Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). 
The paradox approach is a direct response to the shortcomings of the contingency 
approach. The existing literature on the paradox approach (e.g. Lewis, 2000; Schreyögg & 
Sydow, 2010; Smith & Lewis, 2011) stresses that under certain conditions (such as high 
dynamism, heterogeneity, and complexity) it is necessary to go beyond a simple contingency 
approach and accept the necessity of accommodating several conflicting environmental 
strategies at the same time. As Smith and Lewis write: ‘Today, as globalization, innovation, 
hypercompetition, and social demands create more dynamic and intricate environments, 
paradox becomes a critical theoretical lens’ that can be used ‘to understand and lead 
contemporary organizations’ (2011, p. 398). In the globalized world there are frequently 
paradoxical situations where the different societal and environmental demands remain 
unresolved as no stable solution can be found. As a consequence, corporations are likely to 
employ several different legitimacy strategies in parallel despite the (latent) conflict between 
them. The either-or-logic of the contingency approach is replaced by the both-and-logic of the 
paradox approach. 
Of the three approaches to selecting legitimacy strategies presented here, the paradox 
approach seems to be the most suitable one in the context of the postnational constellation and 
the corporate contribution to SD (Habermas, 2001; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). This does not 
imply that the insights of the contingency approach are invalid. Instead, the paradox approach 
can be understood as an extension of the contingency approach that can be applied in 
situations where environmental demands are characterized by high dynamism, complexity 
and heterogeneity, as is the case with the postnational constellation and the related 
sustainability issues (Smith & Lewis, 2011). In this sense, our own framework of legitimacy 
strategies, discussed in the second section of this paper, incorporates aspects of contingency 
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theory in the description of the advantages that different strategies have in relation to different 
contextual factors. Yet, in the setting that the postnational constellation describes, 
corporations will typically have to mix different strategies in order to ensure their 
sustainability. In contrast to what the contingency approach would suggest, there is no general 
solution to the problem of strategy selection that can be applied in advance (Lewis, 2000; 
Smith & Lewis, 2011). Organizations can merely develop the organizational and individual 
capabilities necessary for activating the various modes of generating legitimacy, and they will 
have to determine the mix of legitimacy strategies anew in each concrete situation they face 
(see Greenwood et al., 2011). 
Creating the organizational preconditions for activating each of the three legitimacy 
strategies simultaneously poses a significant challenge for corporations. Corporations that try 
to develop the ability to activate all three legitimacy strategies simultaneously are typically 
confronted with the paradox of meeting opposing structural demands. Building on the existing 
literature on organizational paradoxes, we can distinguish three different ways in which 
organizations can accommodate the various strategies (Schreyögg and Sydow, 2010): first, 
structural solutions (Gilbert, 2005; Tushman and O’Reilly, 2008; for overviews see 
Greenwood et al., 2011; Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008); second, contextual solutions (Gibson 
and Birkinshaw 2004; Smith and Tushman, 2005; for an overview see Greenwood et al., 2011; 
Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008); third, solutions based on reflection capacities (Schreyögg and 
Kliesch-Eberl, 2007; Schreyögg and Steinmann, 1987; Schreyögg and Sydow, 2010). These 
solutions are helpful for understanding how companies can manage different legitimacy 
strategies. These ideas have not yet been applied to legitimacy issues when the corporate 
contribution to SD is at stake. 
Structural solutions deal with conflicting organizational functions by means of 
‘structural separation’ (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004, p. 210). This entails putting in place a 
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range of structures so that the different units or groups within the organization focus on 
different functions (Adler et al., 1999; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). More precisely, this 
enables organizations to dedicate different units or groups to different legitimacy strategies. 
For example, marketing and public relations departments may focus on strategic manipulation 
(Christensen, 1995), while specialized groups may coordinate an open dialogue with 
stakeholders in the context of a moral reasoning strategy in order to address sustainability 
issues (Payne & Calton, 2004). At the same time, other groups or units, such as investor 
relations, may be tightly coupled to specific stakeholders, ensuring the timely recognition of 
changes in the latter’s perceptions and managing the respective adaptation processes within 
the organization (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). In this scenario, each unit or group specializes 
in a particular legitimacy strategy; thus, it is not exposed to the tensions between the different 
strategies. However, as critics have pointed out (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Greenwood et 
al., 2011), such structural solutions merely shift the tension between the different functional 
requirements to other levels without resolving the question of how the activities of the various 
units or groups should be coordinated. As Schreyögg and Sydow write: ‘Strict separation is 
likely to result in sharp interfaces, ambiguous priorities and a lack of a common orientation’ 
(2011, p. 1257). 
Contextual solutions, in contrast, create an internal organizational context that 
encourages individuals to make their own judgments about sustainability issues and about 
which actions are the most appropriate in a given situation and ‘“to do whatever it takes” to 
deliver results’ (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004, p. 213). The management of the tension 
between different requirements is thus shifted to the level of the individual. Contextual 
solutions require ‘ambitextrous leaders […] who are able to understand, and are sensitive to, 
the expectations and requirements of constituencies of multiple logics’ (Greenwood et al., 
2011, p. 356) and who also encourage organizational members to use their own judgments. In 
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terms of organizational design, the only requirement is that the organization creates the 
appropriate contextual conditions, i.e. discipline, stretch, support and trust (Raisch & 
Birkinshaw, 2008) that will help stimulate specific behavioural competences. Thus, this 
approach allows every individual to decide in every concrete situation whether to apply 
strategic manipulation, isomorphic adaptation, or moral reasoning in order to address the 
legitimacy issues that are involved in the corporation’s contribution to sustainable 
development. However, this solution also has its shortcomings. In particular, it has been 
pointed out that the focus on the individual ‘overstretches the behavioural flexibility of 
individual members’ (Schreyögg & Sydow, 2010, p. 1259). Individuals have their cognitive 
limits (Raisch et al., 2009) and their behaviour is influenced by organizational routines, so it 
is unlikely that providing a stimulating context suffices to ensure that the members of the 
organization select the appropriate response strategies to legitimacy demands. 
Developing internal reflection capacities offers another approach to dealing with the 
paradoxical tensions mentioned above. For this purpose, the corporation creates internal 
platforms for ‘meta-level processes’ (Schreyögg & Sydow, 2010, p. 1259). These platforms 
allow the company to select appropriate response strategies to legitimacy challenges that are 
linked to the corporation’s contribution to sustainability. These meta-level processes might be 
located on different organizational levels. For example, legitimacy challenges might be 
initially discussed on the level of the particular subunit in which they have arisen; 
nevertheless, if the participants come to the conclusion that the particular challenge and 
potential responses to it also concern other parts of the organization, the discourse on the topic 
might be shifted to higher organizational levels that encompass a broader set of organizational 
members (e.g. representatives of the different parts of the organization). This has the 
advantage of allowing both for direct, localized responses, as well as for more coordinated 
responses among various parts of the organization.  
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Like the other approaches to managing paradoxical tensions, this approach also has 
some shortcomings. First, it is probably unrealistic to assume that it would be possible to hold 
an internal reflective discourse every time a legitimacy challenge related to the corporate 
involvement with sustainable development arises, given that this would consume a lot of time 
and resources. Second, this solution presupposes certain elements of the other two solutions: 
in particular, critical discourse is only possible if there are individuals capable of critical 
thinking and discussion. These abilities can be encouraged through the creation of a 
stimulating organizational context, supportive leadership, and appropriate HR policies, such 
as the selection of open-minded people, personal training in situations of ambiguity and 
conflict, and incentive systems that endorse reflective critique (see e.g. Kang & Snell, 2009). 
Similarly, the selected legitimacy strategies might require specific groups or units that are 
capable of implementing them. These might include marketing and PR departments whose 
staff have the necessary skills in strategic manipulation, specialized teams that can provide a 
platform for an open discourse with stakeholders, or teams that are able to manage the process 
of change in the case of isomorphic adaptations. 
As indicated earlier, the capacity of an organization to accommodate all legitimacy 
strategies seems to rest on a combination of the three different solutions: the capacity for 
internal reflection means that the different legitimacy challenges of unsustainable business 
practices can be considered on different levels of the organization and the selected strategies 
in response to those challenges can be better coordinated. The contextual solutions approach 
helps individual members acquire an at least basic ability to select between different 
legitimacy strategies in direct contact with their local stakeholders and their concerns about 
sustainability issues. This can also help reduce the number of internal reflection platforms that 
these processes require and encourage individuals to develop the critical ability that is 
necessary for conducting reflective discussions. Finally, the structural solutions approach can 
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help the organization develop the ability to employ its chosen legitimacy strategies in an 
effective and efficient way. Seen from this perspective, the corporation will be able to develop 
a both-and-logic in order to respond to the challenges of paradox and to manage the 
legitimacy expectations with regards to sustainable business practices. 
CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
We started this paper with the observation that the debates on sustainable development and on 
corporate legitimacy have become strongly entangled, in the sense that corporations that do 
not conform to expectations about sustainability will see their legitimacy challenged. Drawing 
on the existing literature, we have argued that the opportunity to tackle perceived legitimacy 
challenges is what mainly motivates corporations to adopt sustainable practices and engage in 
debates on SD issues. The traditional approach to such challenges entails either adapting 
isomorphically to the expectations of the external stakeholders or strategically manipulating 
those expectations without altering the corporation’s existing structures and practices. 
However, we argued that it is no longer sufficient for MNCs to rely on these two legitimacy 
strategies due to the growing complexity and heterogeneity of today’s social environment 
(Child & Rodrigues, 2011; Jones & Fleming, 2003; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2011; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Instead, corporations are increasingly acknowledging 
the necessity of moral reasoning as an alternative legitimacy strategy (Palazzo and Scherer, 
2006) and also the need to develop the capacity to activate all three legitimacy strategies 
simultaneously, if necessary. We showed that both the ‘one best way’ approach (e.g. Ulrich, 
2000) and the contingency approach (e.g. Child & Rodrigues, 2011) with their focus on a 
single legitimacy strategy (in general or for each situation) are problematic as corporations 
navigate in an increasingly fragmented and dynamic global environment facing multiple, 
heterogeneous and conflicting SD related challenges. In such contexts, the successful 
maintenance and repair of legitimacy tends to require a much more sophisticated approach 
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calling for a capacity to use the three strategies in combination in order to address the various 
legitimacy issues related to the corporation’s contribution to SD. Drawing on the burgeoning 
paradox literature (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008; Schreyögg & Sydow, 2010; Smith & Lewis, 
2011), we described how corporations can develop such a capacity by combining structural 
and contextual arrangements with internal platforms for reflection. We argue that corporations 
that possess this capacity are more successful in preserving their legitimacy in face of 
multiple, heterogeneous and conflicting SD related challenges than those that do not. 
Overall, this paper makes contributions to two streams of literature. First, it 
contributes to the burgeoning SD literature by providing a systematic analysis of SD-related 
issues from the perspective of organizational legitimacy. While other authors have already 
pointed to the fruitfulness of the institutional perspective for studying how corporations deal 
with SD-related issues (Bansal, 2005; Jennings & Zandbergen, 1995; Schaefer, 2007), this is 
the first paper to provide a systematic analysis of the different legitimacy strategies. Thus, we 
contribute to this literature by providing an integrated framework of the different legitimacy 
strategies and the ways in which they are employed. Beyond that, we make a further 
contribution to the SD debate by elaborating on the challenges resulting particularly from 
operations in increasingly fragmented and dynamically globalized environments, which 
require a ‘paradox approach’ for managing SD-related legitimacy concerns. Second, we 
contribute to the legitimacy literature, which has lately taken a particular interest in 
understanding the organizational responses to institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 
2011). We show that the integration of concepts from the paradox literature can help explain 
how organizations are able to respond to contradictory legitimacy demands by employing 
conflicting strategies in parallel, which implies a both-and-logic instead of an either-or-logic. 
In the light of the present study, we see three interesting avenues for further research. 
A first area for further research concerns the appropriateness of different legitimacy strategies. 
 
  
40/50 
The appropriateness of the different strategies with regards to particular issues in particular 
situations can be evaluated from two different epistemological perspectives: those strategies 
(and their combinations) can be appropriate or inappropriate from a normative point of view. 
Cognitive legitimacy might for instance be inappropriate in this sense, when the corporations 
adapts to the local rules in a repressive regime. However, appropriateness can be evaluated 
also from a purely instrumental point of view. The above discussed decision by Walmart to 
react to external pressure concerning its unsustainable practices with a manipulation strategy 
backfired and harmed the legitimacy of the corporation even further. The instrumental 
interpretation of our concept of legitimacy management will certainly require the 
development of testable hypotheses about the use and combination of the three strategic 
options of adaptation, manipulation and deliberation. The normative interpretation of our 
concept provokes various questions that deserve further elaboration such as the moral 
justification of manipulation strategies or the moral criteria for cognitive legitimacy in 
contexts of repressive or absent regulation. 
Second, the introduction of concepts from legitimacy theory into the SD literature 
emphasizes the significance of communication in dealing with SD-related issues (Phillips et 
al., 2004). Legitimacy challenges and a corporation’s response strategies are constituted to a 
large extent by and through communication – both within, outside, and across the 
organizational boundary (Christensen and Cornelissen, 2011; Christensen et al., 2011; Kuhn, 
2008). For instance, communication plays a significant role in how reflection capacities help 
balance conflicting environmental demands and functional requirements. Future studies 
should investigate how different forms of communication affect the management of 
legitimacy and how they relate to the forms and combinations of legitimacy strategies.  
Finally, a topic that merits further exploration is how organizations accommodate the 
paradoxical demands described in this paper and how they manage to maintain their 
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coherence and avoid disintegration in the face of such paradoxes. It seems that the 
organizational identity might play an important role in providing some sense of unity and 
preserving a boundary between the organization and its environment (Gioia, Schultz and 
Corley, 2000; Schreyögg and Sydow, 2010; Scott and Lane, 2000; Seidl, 2005). Further 
studies could examine to what extent different types of organizational identity enable or 
restrict the corporation’s ability to accommodate multiple legitimacy strategies. 
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